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STATELESS FISHING VESSELS:
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND A
NEW APPROACH
Deirdre M. Warner-Kramer* and Krista Canty**
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed numerous reports of vessels without
nationality fishing in contravention of international conservation and
management measures. During the summer of 1998, for example, four
vessels registered to Sierra Leone were sighted fishing on the high seas in
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) regulatory area.
These vessels were known throughout the international community to be
flying "flags of convenience"--having only the most tenuous link to their
flag state. Bowing to direct diplomatic pressure, Sierra Leone refuted the
vessels' registration, rendering them stateless and, therefore, subject to the
jurisdiction of any state that approached them on the high seas.
Such situations are becoming more common. The apparent increase in
vessels fishing on the high seas without the protection of a flag state likely
has several causes. Many states, like Sierra Leone, known to grant flags of
convenience, have yielded to direct diplomatic pressure and purged their
registries of illegitimate vessels. Others have begun voluntarily applying
the principles underlying the 1995 United Nations Agreement on the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks' and the 1993 Food and Agriculture Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.2 Unfortunately, neither the
* International Affairs Officer, Office of Marine Conservation, Department of State.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or of the United States Government.
** University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2001.
1. Agreement forthe Implementation ofthe Provisions ofthe UnitedNations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement] (not in force).
2. Food and Agriculture Organization: Agreement to Promote Compliance with
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international community nor the United States has effective tools at its
disposal to deal with stateless vessels fishing illegally on the high seas.
This Article reviews the current status of international and United States
domestic law applicable to vessels without nationality seen fishing the high
seas in contravention of international conservation and management
measures. The discussion begins in Part II with a survey of the interna-
tional regime of the high seas, and reviews the importance of the exclusivity
rule of flag state jurisdiction on the high seas and exceptions therein,
including stateless vessels and vessels assimilated to stateless status. Part
III is a brief analysis of international tools and how they interact in the
current international legal regime of the high seas. Part IV outlines the
High Seas Fishing Compliance Act of 1995 as it is currently written, and
suggests a legislative change that would allow the United States to enforce
international and multilateral agreements against stateless vessels and those
assimilated to stateless status seen fishing on the high seas.
II. HIGH SEAS
A. Freedom of the High Seas
"The high seas are open to all states, and no state may validly subject
any part of them to its sovereignty."3  From this customary rule of
international law, codified in the 1982 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),4 it follows that no state has the right to prevent
other states' vessels from using the high seas for any lawful purpose. All
states enjoy freedom on the high seas, though the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas (High Seas Convention)5 provides that this freedom "shall be
exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the interest of other states
h--Ieir exercise of the freedom of the high seas.",6 UNCLOS subjects the
right to fish on the high seas to several general conditions, including
adherence to other treaty obligations assumed by a state,7 respect for the
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas,
adopted Nov. 24, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 969 [hereinafter Compliance Agreement] (not in force).
3. R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 165 (2nd ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CHURCHILL].
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, art. 89, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1267 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter High Seas
Convention].
6. Id. art. 2.
7. See Christopher C. Joyner, Compliance and Enforcement in New International
Fisheries Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271,278 (1998).
rights and duties of coastal states,8 and observance of the fundamental
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.9 Though the
United States is not a Party to UNCLOS, it does treat the majority of the
Convention as customary international law.
As a general rule, ships on the high seas are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction and authority of the state whose flag they lawfully fly.10 This
principle of exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction is firmly rooted in the order
of freedom of the high seas. The international community has traditionally
viewed a fishing vessel as a floating piece of the territory of the nation
whose flag it flies. Thus, it has followed in customary international law
that, save exceptional circumstances, a flag state has the same exclusive
right to exercise legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over its vessels on
the high seas as it does over its territory."
The exclusivity rule was enunciated in the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Case of the S.S. Lotus:
[V]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of
the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the
freedom of the seas, that is to say the absence of any territorial
sovereignty upon the high seas, no State may exercise any kind of
jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them.'
This principle was codified in the High Seas Convention, 13 and re-codified
in UNCLOS. 14 In Lauritzen v. Larsen,5 the United States Supreme Court
emphasized the flag state's regulatory authority and corresponding
responsibility, stating that "[e]ach State under international law may
determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its nationality...
8. See id. (citing UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 1, 87).
9. See id. (citing UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 117-19).
10. See Robert C.F. Reuland, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas:
Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 1161, 1164 (1989).
11. See Rachel Canty, Limits of Coast GuardAuthority to Board Foreign Flag Vessels
on the High Seas, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123, 125 (1998). Customary international law results
from a general practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation. See id. All
states are bound by customary international law unless they have consistently and
conspicuously engaged in a practice contrary to the recognized principle of international
law. See, e.g., HENRY STEINER, ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 240-44 (4th ed.
1994).
12. Case of the S.S. "Lotus"(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)No. 10, at25.
13. See High Seas Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 6(1), 13. The High Seas
Convention provides that "[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and... shall be
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." Id. art. 6(1).
14. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(1).
15. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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thereby accepting responsibility for [a vessel] and acquiring authority over
it.1
6
Nationality of ships is the basis upon which order of the high seas is
maintained. The elaborate system of rules established for the high seas is
meaningless unless a ship lawfully sails under the flag of a recognized state.
The International Law Commission stated that "[t]he absence of any
authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to chaos. One of the
essential adjuncts to the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship
must fly the flag of a single State... ."1" Thus, according to both interna-
tional and domestic law, all vessels must have a nationality.'
B. Exceptions to Exclusivity Rule
The exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction is not absolute; there are
circumstances that might render a vessel stateless. Current international law
holds that a ship is stateless if it lacks proper registration or is not entitled
to fly the flag of a recognized state. UNCLOS opens the possibility of
another type of stateless vessel-one that does not have a genuine link to
the flag state. 19 This requirement, however, is not yet reflected in custom-
ary international law. In general, the rule remains that a ship is not stateless
if it is registered with a recognized state, no matter how tenuous its
connection to that state may be.
Although "statelessness" is not per se repugnant to the law of nations,
in order to protect the international regime of the high seas, stateless vessels
are generally subject to the jurisdiction of all nations.2" In the case of
Molvan v. A. G.for Palestine, " the court held that stateless vessels enjoy the
protection of no state, implying that ifjurisdiction were asserted over such
a vessel no state would be competent to complain.22 This means that public
ships of every state may approach any private vessel encountered upon the
high seas to ascertain her identity and nationality. If identity or nationality
is in doubt, UNCLOS gives a public ship the right to board the suspect
16. Id. at 584.
17. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) art. 30, comment(l) at 25, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMMISSION, 253, 279, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
18. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) (citing David
Matlin, Note, Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under International Law,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1017, 1019 (199 1)).
19. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, at 1287 (stating "... [t]here must exist a genuine link
between the State and the ship.").
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 522 (1987).
21. Molvan v. A.G. for Palestine, 81 L.I.L. Rep. 277 (1948).
22. See CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 172.
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vessel and investigate its right to fly its flag.' Should examination of the
vessel's papers and documentation discharge the original suspicion, the
vessel may then proceed on its way. However, if it is determined that the
vessel is without nationality, the investigating ship has the right to search
the suspect vessel to discover evidence that would confirm the original
suspicions of the public ship. If such evidence is found, the investigating
ship may arrest the suspect vessel and place it under the jurisdiction of the
investigating ship's flag state.
There is currently only one way that ships properly registered with a
state may be rendered stateless. UNCLOS provides that "[a] ship which
sails under the flags of two or more states, using them according to
convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect
to any other state, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality."'24
As previously discussed, order on the high seas depends on the existence of
a flag state competent to ensure that ships under its flag adhere to interna-
tional law. A vessel that uses two or more flags "according to convenience"
violates the international regime of the high seas to the same extent as one
with no flag at all.' Thus, a vessel may use no more than one flag at a time
unless so entitled under international law.26
III. FISHING VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS
As a result of chronic overfishing, the world's fisheries are in crisis.
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
approximately sixty percent of the world's fisheries are fully exploited or
overfished.27 There are simply too many boats chasing too few fish, both
legally and illegally. In this atmosphere of competition, a fundamental
conflict arose a decade ago between distant-water fishing nations and
coastal states. As stocks close to home became fully exploited, vessels
traveled greater distances in search of new fisheries. To protect their
23. Art. 110 of UNCLOS grants the right of visit boarding, which is the basis for the
boarding, to determine whether a vessel is validly registered. See UNCLOS, supra note 4,
art. 110. See also, High Seas Convention, supra note 5, art. 22.
24. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(2); see also High Seas Convention, supra note 5,
art. 6(2).
25. See Reuland, supra note 10, at 1206 (citing H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF
SHIPS 173 (1967)).
26. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(1). A ship may be entitled to fly two or more
flags as long as it does not intend to have double factors that connect it for different purposes
to different states. See Reuland, supra note 10, at 1206 (citing 2 D. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 754-55 (I. Shearer ed. 1984)).
27. See U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of World Fisheries and
Aquaculture, at Part I World Review ofFisheries and Aquaculture (visited Mar. 26, 2000)
<http://www.fao.orgldocrep/w9900e/w9900eOO.htm>.
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domestic fisheries, coastal states sought increased jurisdiction over marine
resources beyond their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). At the same
time, the distant-water nations, championing the principle of freedom on the
high seas in UNCLOS, fought to obtain greater access to high seas fishery
resources.
This conflict highlighted a major weakness in UNCLOS-it outlines
only general rules of fisheries conservation and management and has little
to say about stocks that straddle or migrate between the high seas and EEZs,
or consequences for overfishing the high seas. In the early 1990s, the
international community responded with a series of international fishery
instruments, culminating in the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance
Agreement.
A. 1993 Food and Agriculture Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas
UNCLOS codified the well-established rule of exclusive flag state
jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. But flag states are often unable
or unwilling to regulate their fishing vessels and even exploit the exclusivity
rule to deny other states the ability to enforce international law against their
vessels. 28 In the early 1990s, as the extent of the crisis in marine fisheries
became clear, individual nations and regional management organizations
began strengthening fisheries management and drastically reducing
allowable catches. Many unscrupulous vessel owners reacted by changing
their ships' flags to nations with no oversight of their fishing practices, or
to states not participating in regional management agreements.
Fearing that reflagging vessels would seriously undermine multilateral
agreements on the conservation and management of high seas fisheries, the
international community adopted the Compliance Agreement in November
1993. Although the original impetus behind the Compliance Agreement
was to deal with the problems of flag of convenience fishing, it grew into
a tool delineating the duties of all flag states. It sets out three fundamental
flag state responsibilities: each must take measures to ensure vessels flying
its flag do not undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and
management regimes; each must prevent its vessels from fishing on the high
seas unless they have been authorized to do so; and each must ensure it can
exercise effective control over vessels fishing under its flag on the high
seas. The negotiators framing the Agreement intended the first responsibil-
28. See David Balton, Dealing with the "BadActors " of Ocean Fisheries (visited Mar.
20, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1999/990520_balton_fisheries.
html>.
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ity to apply to rules set by all regional fisheries organizations, whether or
not a given flag state is a member.29 The Agreement also calls upon states
to cooperate in identifying vessels fishing in contravention of multilateral
agreements; once a vessel is known to have undermined conservation and
management measures, no party may authorize that vessel to fish on the
high seas.30
Although the Agreement has yet to enter into force-to date only
fifteen of twenty-five necessary instruments of acceptance have been
deposited- many nations have begun voluntarily applying its principles.
As the "genuine link" provision of the Compliance Agreement becomes a
part of customary international law, vessel owners will find it harder to
reflag to countries that are unable, or unwilling, to enforce international
conservation and management measures. Increased application of this
requirement will not only inhibit vessels from acquiring flags of conve-
nience in the first place, but also result in additional states refuting their
flags of convenience. As with the four Sierra Leone vessels, a combination
of voluntary application of the genuine link requirement and diplomatic
pressures resulted in a flag state anticipatorily refuting its flags when the
vessels were known to be fishing in violation of international law.
Likewise, it is expected that additional high-seas fishing vessels flying flags
of convenience will be rendered stateless.
B. 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
UNCLOS constitutes a vital regulatory framework, though it lacks
specific provisions delineating the legal rights and duties of states that
harvest fish swimming between EEZs and the adjacent high seas. This lack
of provisions hindered effective implementation or enforcement of
conservation measures for straddling or migratory stocks, and made
conflicts between coastal states and distant water nations inevitable. The
Fish Stocks Agreement was negotiated to build upon the general provisions
ofUNCLOS and address jurisdiction and management of straddling stocks.
This Agreement specifies mechanisms for cooperation between coastal
states and distant-water nations, particularly the use of regional organiza-
29. See Stetson Tinkham, Flag of Convenience and Illegal, Unregulated, and
Unreported Fishing Threats to Sustainable Fishing, Address at Conference on Fisheries
Monitoring Control and Surveillance, Santiago, Chile (Jan. 25-26, 2000) (on file with the
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
30. See Compliance Agreement, supra note 2, art. III, at 971; see also id. art. V, at 973.
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tions, to ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling stocks.3' Notably,
the Agreement prescribes a precautionary approach to fishery manage-
ment.32 In seeking compatible conservation and management measures in
areas of national jurisdiction and those on the high seas, the Agreement
encourages states to cooperate to ensure the sustainability of stocks in their
entirety regardless ofjurisdictional location. 33 To date, twenty-six states of
the needed thirty to bring the Fish Stocks Agreement into force have
deposited instruments of ratification.
Articles 8(3) and 8(4) of the Fish Stocks Agreement seek to promote the
integrity of regional fisheries management organizations (RFOs) by
requiring that all states whose vessels fish for regulated marine stocks
should eitherjoin the RFOs or apply the adopted fishing restrictions to their
flag vessels.34 Restricting access to regulated fishery resources to states that
are members of RFOs, or that agree to apply the fishing rules established by
such organizations, 35 has created conflict. Under traditional concepts of
international law all states have the right to fish on the high seas, whether
or not they are members of the organization that manages the fisheries in
that high seas area.36 Disputes often arise between RFO members and non-
members who exercise their right and do not cooperate with such organiza-
tions.37 Because states that are not members of RFOs have not undertaken
obligations associated with such membership, they have no vested interest
in conservation efforts and stand to benefit from harvesting as many fish as
possible, as quickly as possible.
To address this, the Fish Stocks Agreement establishes new precedents
for high seas enforcement. Article 21 allows non-flag states to board and
inspect member and non-member vessels fishing on the high seas to ensure
compliance with conservation and management measures established by
RFOs. 3s Further enforcement action, including ordering a fishing vessel to
port, may be taken in the case of serious violations by vessels whose flag
31. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 1, art. 5, at 1550; id. art. 8, at 1553.
32. See id. art. 6, at 1551.
33. See id. art. 2, at 1549; id. art. 7, at 1552.
34. See Balton, supra note 28, at 5 (citing Fish Stocks Agreement supra note 1, art. 8,
at 1553, which states: "Only those States which are members of such an organization... or
which agree to apply the conservation and management measures established... shall have
access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply.").
35. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 1, art. 17, at 1559.
36. See generally U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Fisheries, and
Space Mary Beth West, New International initiatives to Restore and Sustain Fisheries at a
World Wildlife Conference in Lisbon (September 15, 1998).
37. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Jurisdiction (Int'l Ct. Just. Dec. 4,
1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org> (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds Spain's application
against Canada for seizing a Spanish vessel on the high seas).
38. See generally Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 1, 21.
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state either cannot or will not exercise proper control over them.39
Regardless of the violation, however, if a vessel is lawfully flying a flag and
the flag state asserts jurisdiction, the parties to the RFO are without legal
recourse to enforce established measures on the high seas, despite it being
a regulated area.
Various RFOs have addressed the problem of"free for all" non-member
fishing activity in two ways. First, some RFOs have imposed trade
sanctions on non-member states, such as prohibiting the import of fish
harvested by them. 0 Second, other RFOs have regulated or restricted
landings of fish caught by non-member vessels.4 1
C. The NAFO Experience
The activities of non-member fishing vessels have presented a persistent
problem in the NAFO Regulatory Area (NRA).42 In response to the serious
depletion of managed fish stocks, NAFO members agreed to make
individual sacrifices and impose moratoria on several of the stocks.
Although the number of non-member vessels caught fishing in the NRA has
decreased significantly-from forty-seven in 1988 to five in 1998-non-
members continue to target fish stocks under moratoria or fully allocated to
NAFO members.43
In 1997, NAFO adopted a "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-
Contracting Party Fishing Vessels with Conservation and Enforcement
Measures Established byNAFO." 4 This Scheme establishes apresumption
that any non-member vessel sighted fishing in the NRA is undermining
NAFO conservation and management measures. Should the vessel then
enter the port of any NAFO member, that member must inspect the vessel
39. See id. arts. 6-8,21.
40. For example, the International Commission for the Conservation ofAtlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) has adopted schemes to impose multilaterally-agreed trade restrictions on both
members and non-members alike who undermine ICCAT conservation and management
measures governing Atlantic bluefin tuna and Atlantic swordfish.
41. This approach was pioneered by NAFO, as discussed below, but other organiza-
tions such as ICCAT and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR) have instituted catch certification schemes that essentially serve the
same purpose.
42. See GOV'T OF THE U.S., IMPLEMENTATION OF THEKEY PROVISIONS OFTHE UNITED
NATIONS AGREEMENT ON THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH
STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS BY REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 8 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter KEY PROVISIONS].
43. See id.
44. Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the
Conservation and Enforcement Measures Established by NAFO (visited Mar. 10, 2000)
<http://www.nafo.ca/managementscheme.pdf>.
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before it lands or transships any fish. Should the inspection reveal NAFO
regulated species, landings and transshipments are prohibited unless the
vessel can demonstrate that the species were harvested either outside the
NRA or otherwise in a manner that did not undermine NAFO rules.
At its 1998 Annual Meeting, the NAFO Fisheries Commission
strengthened the scheme by requiring that member enforcement officials
report sightings of non-member fishing activity in the NRA.4 The fishing
vessels of NAFO members are then prohibited from receiving trans-
shipments from those sighted and reported vessels. More recently, at its
Twenty-first Annual Meeting in the fall of 1999, NAFO adopted a
statement extending the Scheme to vessels "for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting them to be without nationality."'46 Any stateless
vessel now seen fishing in the NRA is presumed to be undermining NAFO
conservation and management regimes, thus incurring the same landing
restrictions as non-member vessels. More significantly, the statement
included an exhortation to NAFO Contracting Parties to examine their own
domestic measures allowing jurisdiction over stateless vessels.
IV. UNITED STATES LAW
Under international law, the United States Coast Guard has the
authority to enforce U.S. laws extraterritorially with regard to stateless
vessels. Under domestic law, it has been argued that Congress has granted
the Coast Guard broad law enforcement authority to combat violations of
U.S. law that occur on the high seas whenever there is a reasonable
suspicion that there is a violation of a U.S. law with extraterritorial
application.47 United States statutory law provides: "[A] vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States includes--(A) vessel without national-
ity .... ,4B In United States v. Marino-Garcia,49 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "[v]essels without nationality
are international pariahs. They have no internationally recognized right to
navigate freely on the high seas."'
45. See KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 42, at 9.
46. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Report of the General Council, 21st
Annual Meeting, 13-17 September 1999, Dartmouth, N.S. Canada.
47. See Canty, supra note 11, at 124 (citing 14 U.S.C.A. § 89(a) (West 1990)).
48. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999). See also Fishery Conservation
and Management, as amended PUB. L. No. 102-251, § 301(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(44)
(West Supp. 2000) (incorporating definition applied to drug cases to fishing violations under
this statute).
49. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11 th Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 1382.
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As the law now stands, the United States Coast guard is authorized to
stop and search any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
If the United States Coast Guard encountered a flagless vessel on the high
seas and determined it to be stateless, it could be boarded and all applicable
U.S. laws could be enforced against it. Usually, when stateless vessels are
encountered on the high seas, the United States asserts jurisdiction and
seizes them for violation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act52 or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.53
A. High Seas Fishing Compliance Act of 1995
The High Seas Fishing Compliance Act (HSFCA)54 is the U.S.
implementing legislation for the Compliance Agreement. As previously
illustrated, the purposes and objectives of the Compliance Agreement are
to specify flag states' responsibility towards fishing vessels entitled to fly
their flags and operate on the high seas. The application of the HSFCA to
stateless vessels could face an argument that it is not within the stated
purposes and objectives of the Agreement. One response would be found
in section 5501, which states that the purpose of the HSFCA is to
"implement" the Compliance Agreement.55 The use of the word
"implement" does not necessarily encompass the purposes and objectives
of the Agreement and transfer them into the HSFCA5
51. See 14U.S.C.A. § 89(a) (West 1990).
52. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A.)
53. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1904 (West Supp. 1999); see also electronic mail
communication from Rachel Canty, United States Coast Guard, Law Enforcement, to Author
(Feb. 23,2000) (on file with Ocean and CoastalLawJourna). In the past, the United States
Coast Guard, in concurrence with the United States Attorney General and other appropriate
agencies, has exertedjurisdiction and prosecuted stateless vessel for illegally fishing in U.S.
waters or smuggling drugs or migrants. See id.
54. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 5501-5509 (West Supp. 1999).
55. See id. § 5501. Section 5501 states, in part, that:
[I]t is the purpose of [the Act] (1) to implement the Agreement to Promote Compli-
ance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels
on the High Seas, adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations on November 24, 1993; and (2) to establish a system of
permitting, reporting, and regulation for vessels of the United States fishing on the
high seas.
Id.
56. Congressional use of the word implement as opposed to a direction that "[t]he
Secretary shall promulgate regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose and
objectives of the Convention" as found in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention Act
of 1995, implies more latitude in the United States's application of the Compliance
Agreement. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention Act of 1995, PuB. L.No. 104-43, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 5601-5610 (West Supp. 1999).
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That aside, the first unlawful act cited in the HSFCA is "to use a high
seas fishing vessel in contravention of international conservation and
management measures .... ",' Under international law, any state may make
a stateless vessel subject to their jurisdiction. Once the stateless vessel is
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, it is appropriately treated as
a vessel of the United States. A stateless vessel, once under the jurisdiction
of the United States, fishing in contravention of international conservation
and management measures should, therefore, fall within the scope of the
HSFCA.
Unfortunately, the HSFCA, as currently written, is limited in its
applicability to stateless vessels. In section 5502(4), the HSFCA defines a
high seas fishing vessel as:
any vessel of the United States used or intended for use-(A) on
the high seas; (B) for the purpose of the commercial exploitation of
living marine resources; and (C) as a harvesting vessel, as a mother
ship, or as any other support vessel directly engaged in a fishing
operation."
Section 5502(10) notes: "the terms 'vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States'5 9 and 'vessel without nationality' 6° have the same meaning
as in section 1903(c)(3)" of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(MDLE). 6' The MDLE also contains a separate definition for a "vessel of
57. 16 U.S.C.A. § 5505(1) (West Supp. 1999).
58. Id. § 5502.
59. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999) defines a "vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" to include:
(A) a vessel without nationality; (B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without
nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention of
the High Seas; (C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has
consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United
States; and (E) a vessel located in the territorial waters of another nation, where the
nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States.
Id.
60. Id. § 1903(c)(2). Section 1903(c)(2) defines a "vessel without nationality" to
include:
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry,
which claim is denied by the flag nation whose registry is claimed; (B) any vessel
aboard which the master or person in charge fails, upon request of an officer of the
United States empowered to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to
make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and (C) a vessel aboard which
the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation of
registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its
nationality.
Id.
61. Id. § 1903(c).
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the United States. 62 Except for the difference of a few words, which do not
function to alter the meaning of the section, the HSFCA utilizes the same
language to define "vessel of the United States,"63 which does not encom-
pass stateless vessels. In specifying that a high seas fishing vessel must be
a vessel of the United States, the HSFCA appears to preclude prosecution
of stateless vessels assimilated to U.S. jurisdiction.'
The difficulty in applying the HSFCA against stateless vessels is found
in section 5505 states that "it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States- (1)to use a high seas fishing vessel on the
high seas in contravention of international conservation and management
measures" as recognized by the United States.65 Section 5502(4) defines a
high seas fishing vessel to include only vessels of the United States. If the
language of the HSFCA were to be changed, the United States would be
able to prosecute stateless vessels fishing on the high seas under any law
that U.S. vessels must obey.66 Utilizing the HSFCA in this manner would
62. The definition is as follows:
(1) a vessel documented under chapter 121 of title 46 or a vessel numbered as
provided in chapter 123 of that title; (2) a vessel owned in whole or part by-(A) the
United States or a territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States; (B) a
State or political subdivision thereof; (C) a citizen or national of the United States or
(D) a corporation created under the laws of the United States or any State, the District
of Columbia, or any territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States; ...
(E) a vessel that was once documented under the laws of the United States and, in
violation of the laws of the United States, was either sold to a person not a citizen of
the United States or placed under foreign registry or a foreign flag, whether or not the
vessel has been granted the nationality of a foreign nation.
Id. § 1903(c)(3).
63. 16 U.S.C.A. § 5502(9) (West Supp. 1999).
64. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Assistant
General Counsel for Fisheries, Margaret Hayes, the United States Coast Guard had
recognized the limitation in using the term "vessel of the United States" as a result of their
experience prosecuting stateless vessels under the MDLE. See Electronic Mail from
Margaret Hayes, NOAA General Counsel to Deirdre Wamer-Kramer (Mar. 21, 2000) (on
file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal). Unfortunately, though the Coast Guard
successfully lobbied to include the additional term, "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" in the text of the HSFCA, the inclusion did not occur until the text of the
legislation had been drafted and, as will be demonstrated, does not function to rectify the
initial limitation.
65. A plain language reading of the definition of "fishing vessels" in the Compliance
Agreement permits the inclusion of stateless vessels throughout the body of the Agreement.
Under Article I, DEFINITIONS, a "fishing vessel" includes "any vessel used or intended for
use for the purposes of the commercial exploitation of living marine resources, including
mother ships and any other vessels directly engaged in such fishing operations. Compliance
Agreement, supra note 2, at 970.
66. The potential issue of how the stateless vessel would be treated under the applicable
convention once it is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, i.e. as a Contracting
Party or non-Contracting Party, is addressed later in this paper.
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not add any additional restrictions regarding conservation and management
measures to U.S. fishermen under either domestic or international law. It
would simply broaden the applicability of existing domestic laws to vessels
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This would afford an
additional authority to the United States in effort to make stateless vessels
accountable to international conservation and management measures when
fishing on the high seas.
B. Suggested Change to the HSFCA
and Resulting Enforcement Authority
The suggested change to the HSFCA would affect section 103(4) as
follows:
The term "high seas fishing vessel" means any vessel of the United
States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (insert)
used or intended for use-
Similar language already exists in the prohibition against large-scale driftnet
fishing contained in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act.67 This prohibition was used in the summer of 1999 when
the United States Coast Guard sighted a vessel named the Ying Fa engaging
in large-scale driftnet fishing in the North Pacific. The vessel claimed to be
registered in the People's Republic of China, but China refuted her
registration. Declaring the vessel to be stateless, the Coast Guard seized her
and her catch under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and towed her to port. The
vessel's crew was repatriated to their home countries, and the vessel was
sold at auction.
The technical change suggested above would make three additional
violations available to prosecute stateless vessels fishing any high seas area
managed by a regional fisheries organization. As the United States is a
party to the Compliance Agreement, this is not just limited to organizations
to which the United States is a Contracting Party. First, section 5505(2)
makes it unlawful "to use a high seas fishing vessel on the high seas, unless
the vessel has on board a valid permit. ..."'8 Any stateless vessel made
67. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West Supp. 2000). "It is unlawful (1) for any person (M)
to engage in large-scale driftnet fishing that is subject to the jurisdiction ofthe UnitedStates,
[emphasis added] including use of a fishing vessel of the United States to engage in such
fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation." Id.
68. 16 U.S.C.A. § 5502(2) (West Supp. 1999). The term "to use" is not defined in the
HSFCA and it is unclear if it is broad enough to include the mere existence of a fishing
vessel on the high seas, without a permit, as a violation absent evidence that fishing is in
progress.
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States must meet the same
requirements as U.S. vessels, though no stateless vessel could actually be
in possession of such a permit. Of the unlawful acts delineated in the
HSFCA, the use of a high seas fishing vessel on the high seas without a
valid permit is the most unambiguous.
Second, it is prohibited under section 5505(9) "to ship, transport, offer
for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control, or
possession of, any living marine resource taken or retained in violation of
this title or any regulation or permit issued under this title." Section
5509(e) sets a rebuttable presumption that "all living marine resources
found on board a high seas fishing vessel and which are seized in connec-
tion with an act prohibited by section 5509 are presumed to have been taken
or retained in violation of this title .... ." As long as the vessel is found to
be in violation of the HSFCA, or any regulation or permit issued under the
HSFCA, any fish found on board are presumed to have been taken or
retained in violation of the HSFCA. Thus, the need to prove, for example,
that the species of fish caught on board are regulated and were caught by
directed fishing, not bycatch, is not necessary.
The third violation is listed at section 5505(1): a prohibition against
using a vessel in contravention of international conservation and manage-
ment measures. Prosecution under this rule, however, would be a bit more
complicated. Determining a violation in this case would depend largely on
the standard by which a vessel is measured under the appropriate imple-
menting legislation.69 The majority of international fisheries agreements
classify violations of conservation and management measures depending on
whether the vessel is one of a Contracting Party (CP) or non-Contracting
Party (NCP). Currently, the only international fisheries agreement to deal
explicitly with stateless vessels is NAFO. As previously mentioned, NAFO
recently passed a new rule subjecting stateless vessels to the same standard
or violations as NCP vessels.
In other regulatory areas, the question of how stateless vessels are
classified is critical. The HSFCA requires that under section 5505(1), there
must be a violation of the relevant convention for there to be a violation of
the HSFCA. Yet in order to find a violation, there must be a standard
against which to measure the violator.
In most regional fisheries organizations, enforcement of conservation
and management measures against NCP vessels depends upon the existence
of a flag state. Restrictions such as trade sanctions or landing prohibitions
are meaningless if there is no flag state to which to apply them. Clearly,
then, stateless vessels cannot be considered NCP vessels. If, however, the
69. For the purposes of international conservation and management measures the
implementing legislation typically refers back to the governing convention.
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stateless vessel, now made subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
is to be considered a vessel of a CP, it raises further questions of whether
the vessel is then entitled to the fishing privileges available to vessels of the
United States. If so, in order to utilize section 5505(1), the procedures for
allotting the U.S. share of the total allowable catch in the relevant regula-
tory area must be reviewed. If the national entitlement is divided among
U.S. vessels prior to the fishing season, a stateless vessel fishing without a
vessel quota would be a violation of section 5505(1). If, however, the U.S.
national catch entitlement is divided among vessels of the United States on
a first come, first served basis and the U.S. quota has not yet been filled, it
is unclear if a stateless vessel, now treated as a vessel of the United States,
is actually violating any international conservation and management
measure.
Assuming that this question will soon be addressed in all regional
organizations as it was in NAFO, the proposed changes to the HSFCA
would make all international conservation and management measures, as
recognized by the United States and applied to vessels of the United States,
applicable to vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Specifically, it would apply whether or not the term "vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" was included in substitution or in addition
to "vessel of the United States" in any given piece of implementing
legislation. Furthermore, it would create a uniform penalty scheme for the
violation of such measures regardless of the penalties ascribed by the
relevant implementing legislation.7"
V. CONCLUSION
The recent efforts of the international community reflect a definitive
movement toward conservation and a heightened need for fair play on the
high seas. The international community is developing rules on both a
global and regional basis to deal with "bad actors" on the high seas.7' Even
as the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement are moving
closer to entry into force, individual nations and regional fisheries
70. The "CIVIL PENALTIES AND PERMIT SANCTIONS" of section 5507(a) allow
a penalty for each violation up to the amount of $100,000. See 16 U.S.C. § 5507(a) (West
Supp. 1999). Under section 5507(b), Permit Sanctions, penalties refer primarily to
suspending or revoking a high seas fishing permit. See id. § 5507(b). Forfeiture under
section 5509 includes: "any high seas fishing vessel . .. used and any living marine
resources ... taken or retained, in any manner, in connection with or as a result of the
commission of any act prohibited by Section 5505 ... shall be subject to forfeiture to the
United States .... 16 U.S.C.A. § 5509 (West Supp. 1999).
71. See Balton, supra note 28, for a discussion on who these bad actors are and how
their actions jeopardize sustainable fisheries.
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organizations have begun putting the principles they contain into action.
The international community has begun to call instinctively for a stronger
conservation ethic to govern high seas fishing.
Despite these notable measures, bad actors continue to jeopardize the
sustainability of the world's fishery resources. The international commu-
nity continues to face both nations and vessels that are unwilling to adhere
to international law and undermine conservation and management schemes.
Numerous nations continue to offer "flag of convenience" registry to
fishing vessels with no accompanying oversight of their fishing practices.
Parties to international agreements and regional organizations often exceed
agreed quotas or are out of compliance with conservation and management
regimes. Furthermore, nations continue to subsidize their fishing industries,
leading to overcapitalization and increasing pressure to maximize harvest.
The suggested legislative change to the HSFCA would forge a useful tool
for United States enforcement of international and multilateral agreements
on the high seas against stateless vessels. Specifically, this proposed
change would allow the United States to prosecute any vessel assimilated
to stateless status for two and possibly three violations: (1) using a high seas
fishing vessel on the high seas without a valid permit; (2) taking and/or
possession offish; and possibly (3) fishing in contravention of international
conservation and management measures. As countries continue to
cooperate to conserve and manage high seas resources, vessels without
nationality should not be allowed to undermine progress made through
shared sacrifices for no other reason than the lack of an effective enforce-
ment tool.
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